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This paper derives analytical expressions for aggregate personal income tax revenue 
obtained from a multi-schedular and multi-regional personal income tax system, with 
revenue divided among central and regional governments. Aggregate income tax 
revenue is expressed as a function of characteristics of the distribution of taxable 
income, making it possible to identify the sources of revenue differences among 
regions. The approach is applied to the tax structure in Spain, and the effects of 
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1  Introduction 
A number of countries have separate tax structures, with different tax rates and 
income thresholds, for different sources of income, in addition to different rules 
regarding eligible deductions. Thus they are said to have multiple ‘schedules’. In 
addition, tax revenue in some countries is divided between central government and 
autonomous regions or states. Some transfer payments, in the form of tax credits, 
may also be administered at both the central and regional level. One feature of fiscal 
policy in a multi-regional economy involves transfers among regions having quite 
different population sizes and income distributions, relating not only to the forms of 
the relevant distributions but the extent to which incomes are derived from different 
sources. These elements introduce a number of complexities in modelling aggregate 
tax revenue.  
 
For tax planning purposes it is important to be able to model aggregate revenue 
allowing for these complications and in particular to be able to estimate the 
implications for total income tax revenue of a range of exogenous changes. Those 
changes include simple changes in tax rates and thresholds and, importantly, changes 
in the income distributions of different income sources within regions.  
 
The aim of this paper is therefore to provide a method of examining the implications 
for total tax revenue of a number of changes, including changes in the distribution of 
income and in the tax structure itself, in a multi-schedular and multi-regional 
economy. It is shown how an expression for aggregate tax revenue depends on 
proportions of people, within each region, and proportions of total income between 
the income thresholds of the income tax functions. 
 
The methods used are widely applicable. However, after deriving the general results, 
the approach is applied to the Spanish personal income tax structure. This provides 
an interesting case study as it has undergone significant reforms, in additional to the 3 
 
type of base-broadening and rate-reducing changes which have been common in 
many other countries.
2 Furthermore, income taxation since 2002 is shared between 
central and regional governments, consisting of 15 autonomous regions within the 
Common Territory. In addition, different tax rates and thresholds apply to a range of 
income sources in a multi-schedular tax structure. Various tax credits exist at central 
and regional levels, some of which depend on non-income as well as income 
characteristics of tax units.  
 
Section 2 formulates analytical expressions for the tax liability of each tax unit. 
Aggregate tax revenue is then examined in more detail in Section 3. The method is 
applied to Spain in Section 4. Brief conclusions are given in Section 5.  
 
2  A Tax Structure with Several Schedules and Central and 
Regional Rates 
This section describes a personal income tax structure containing several schedules 
where, in addition, tax revenue is divided between each region and the central 
government.  
2.1  Income Taxation of a Tax Unit 
Let  hi x  denote the taxable income of tax unit h from source  1,..., iI  . In 
transforming from gross to taxable income, there are typically tax-deductible 
expenditures and non-income allowances. The operation of these allowances is not 
considered here, and taxable income is taken as the starting point, rather than gross 
income.  
 
Suppose that the income tax structure has marginal tax rates  ki t  and thresholds  ki a  for 
1,..., kK  , where  ki t  applies between  ki a  and  1, ki a   (with  1, Ki a   ). Where 
separate tax rates are imposed at the central and regional government levels, the 
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income thresholds are typically common. This is the case examined here. Thus, 
letting superscripts C and R refer to central and regional rates respectively: 
 
CR
ki ki ki ttt    (1) 
For a multi-step tax structure with K steps,    0 Tx  for  01 0 ax a  , 
   11 Tx tx a   for  12 ax a , and        12 1 2 2 Tx ta a t x a     for  23 ax a , 
and so on. Then in general, if  1 kk ax a    , Creedy and Gemmell (2006, p. 25) show 
that: 
      ' kk Tx t x a  (2) 
where: 











   (3) 
Hence in the present context, if  1, ki hi k i axa    , unit h is in the kth tax bracket for 
source i and the following expressions describe income taxation at central and 
regional levels. 
     1, '
CC C
ih i k ih ik i k i h h i k i h Tx a x a tx a      (4) 
     1, '
RR R
ih i k ih ik i k i h h i k i h Tx a x a tx a      (5) 
The terms  '
C
ki a  and  '
R
ki a  are the corresponding thresholds such that tax liability in a 
multi-threshold tax structure can be expressed in terms of an equivalent single-rate 
structure. In writing the expressions (4) and (5) the marginal tax rate terms, t, along 
with the effective thresholds,  ' a , need the h subscripts, in order to clarify the point 
that the tax rates and thresholds indicated are those that apply to the tax unit in 
question, depending on the tax bracket into which the unit falls.  
 
Suppose, in addition, there are central and regional government non-refundable tax 
credits of  C C  and  R C . Total tax paid by unit h is expressed as: 
 
11
() m a x 0 , ( ) m a x 0 , ( )
II
CR
hi i hi C i hi R
ii i
Tx T xC T xC

 
   
     (6) 
 
The existence of non-refundable tax credits means that several cases must be 


















  . The expression given in (6) above for tax 
liability is thus simplified to: 
   
1
() ( )( )
I
CR
hi i hi i hi R C
ii
Tx T xT x C C

     (7) 
and: 
   
1
() ( ' ' )
I
CC RR
hi kih hi kih kih kih kih R C
ii
Tx t xt at a C C

      (8) 
 
A further simplification is available where, as here, central and regional income 
thresholds are the same. Using the above expression for  'k a , it can be shown that:  





kih kih kih kih ji ji j i
j
ta ta a t t 

    (9) 
The other cases follow directly from the above results. 
 
3  Total Tax Revenue 
This section derives aggregate revenue for the tax system described above. It also 
demonstrates how the effects on revenue of changes in income distribution, along 
with changes in the tax rates and income thresholds can easily be examined.   
3.1  Aggregation over Individuals 
Suppose there are  CR n   taxpayers whose central and regional tax exceeds the relevant 
credits, equations (8) and (9) can be used to write their tax as: 
  1,
11 1
() ( ) ( ) ( )
ih k I
hi kih hi ji ji j i R C
ii j
Tx t x a t t C C 
 
       
  
   (10) 
which becomes: 




kih hi jih R C
i
TX t x a C C














   . Similarly, suppose there are  R n  and  C n  tax units 
whose tax exceeds regional and central government tax credits respectively. Then 
there are N taxpayers, that is whose tax liability is positive, with  CR R C Nn n n   ).  
 
The total tax revenue can therefore be expressed as: 




kih hi jih R C
hi
Tt x a N C C

      (12) 
Where, as above,  hi x is the taxable income for income source i for tax unit h. The 
terms  C C  and  R C  denote the appropriate average value defined over taxpayers, 
remembering the tax schedule asymmetry whereby tax must be positive. The first 
term in (12) can be rewritten as: 








    (13) 
In the case of a single source of income, with a multi-step function, the tax per person 
can be expressed in terms of summary information about the distribution of taxable 
income, which determines the proportion of tax units falling into the various marginal 
tax rate groups.
3 For example, suppose that    Fx denotes the distribution function of 
taxable income, x>0. Tax per unit is thus: 









tx a d F x


          (14) 
Define   1 Fx  as the first-moment distribution function, that is the proportion of total 
income of units below x, and introduce the general term    k Ga , defined as: 




Ga Fa Fa Fa Fa
x
     (15) 
The first term in curly brackets gives the proportion of total income between adjacent 
thresholds, and the second term in curly brackets is the number of tax units between 
those thresholds. The expression in (16) can also be written as:  
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      
 (16) 
The first term inside the square brackets of (16) is the slope of the Lorenz curve of 
the relevant distribution of income, between the two points associated with adjacent 
income tax thresholds. The Lorenz curve has a slope of 45 degrees at the arithmetic 





 . The second term in the square brackets is simply the 
ratio of the ‘effective’ threshold to arithmetic mean income. And of course the term 
in curly brackets in (16) is the proportion of people within the tax bracket.  
 







   (17) 
 
Hence, for the case of several income sources, each with its own tax schedule, total 
tax revenue over all individuals and sources becomes: 







ik i k R C
ik
TNx t G a NCC


      
   (18) 
The first term in equation (18) can usefully be written in vector notation. Define the 











































Then, if a prime indicates that the vector is written as a row vector: 
 









tG a t G

   (21) 8 
 
These values may be placed in a column vector, denoted   ' tG. Then if x  represents 
a column vector whose ith element consists of the arithmetic mean,  i x , then:  













   (22) 
where, as before, a prime indicates transposition. This allows the effects of tax and 
income distribution changes to be easily examined. Several illustrations of such 
potential effects are given in the following section, in the context of the Spanish 
personal income tax. 
4  An Application: The Spanish Tax Structure 
The Spanish tax structure displays the characteristics considered in the previous 
section, having recently undergone significant tax reforms. In particular, income 
taxation since 2002 is shared between central and regional governments, consisting 
of 15 autonomous regions within the Common Territory. In addition, different tax 
rates and thresholds, and other rules influencing the difference between gross and 
taxable income, apply to a range of income sources: this involves the use of a multi-
schedular tax structure. 
 
The empirical results presented here were obtained using the Personal Income Tax 
information reported for a sample of 896,390 Spanish tax units. The original dataset 
comes from a cross-sectional dataset collected by the Spanish Tax Agency for year 
2002. The data were then adjusted to tax year 2007 and the personal income tax 
structure examined is the one that came into force in January 2007. Following the 
2007 Spanish code, attention is concentrated on just two sources of income. The first 
income source includes: labour income; alimony; self employment income; income 
from property and income applications to shareholders coming from Corporations 
under the fiscal transparency regime.
4 The second income source includes: capital 
gains and any form of income derived from financial savings such as interest rates 
from bank accounts and deposits, share dividends, bond interest or any other type of 
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yield earned from debt saving instruments. Incomes include both monetary 
compensations and fringe benefits. 
 
The marginal rates and thresholds for the first income source are shown in Table 1. 
For the second source, tax is paid at fixed central and regional (marginal and average) 
rates of 0.111 and 0.069.  
 










0 0.1566  0.0834  0.24 
17,360 0.1827  0.0973  0.28 
32,360 0.2414  0.1286  0.37 
52,360 0.2713  0.1587  0.43 
 
 
Table 2 gives, for each region and for all regions combined, the number of 
individuals who pay positive amounts of tax, along with the arithmetic means of the 
two income sources. The final two columns of Table 2 show the arithmetic means of 
the central and regional tax credits, which together give the last term in equation (18). 
There are clearly substantial differences in arithmetic mean incomes among regions.  
 
The expression for aggregate revenue in each region requires the various proportions 
of people and proportions of income below each of the tax thresholds. This is simple 
for the second source of income, since the tax function is linear. For the first income 
source, Tables 3 and 4 report values of the first moment distribution and the 
distribution function respectively, for the required income thresholds. These two 
tables thus together give three points along the Lorenz curve of the first source of 
income in each region. For example, for all regions combined there are 
approximately five per cent of tax units (those paying positive tax) above the top 
threshold for income source 1, and they are responsible for about 20 per cent of total 
income from that source. However, for Madrid, eight per cent of positive taxpayers 
are above the top threshold, and they are responsible for about 30 per cent of total 




Table 2  Number of Taxpayers (with positive tax) and Arithmetic Means of 
Taxable Incomes and Tax Credits (€s) 
   N   1 x   2 x   C C   R C  
National  12,229,939 20,816.74 2,220.59 1,228.84 646.27 
Andalucía  1,772,425 19,148.92 1,686.22 1,254.13 660.46 
Aragón  480,016 19,239.42 2,338.24 1,190.27 626.56 
Asturias  362,701 19,894.59 1,648.66 1,203.68 634.44 
Baleares  311,943 20,006.38 2,313.47 1,176.61 619.04 
Canarias  472,742 20,330.13 1,439.27 1,259.68 661.04 
Cantabria  181,796 19,546.91 2,287.14 1,220.81 642.94 
Castilla-León  790,965 18,619.11 1,889.49 1,208.71 636.20 
Castilla-La  Mancha 469,160 17,565.85 1,563.90 1,216.59 640.83 
Cataluña  2,473,158 22,266.55 2,506.11 1,225.06 643.65 
Valencia  1,391,005 18,720.08 2,278.14 1,197.66 630.46 
Extremadura  244,384 17,149.91 1,378.86 1,190.61 628.12 
Galicia  730,355 18,520.83 1,763.29 1,161.04 612.92 
Madrid  2,131,743 25,885.79 3,096.36 1,279.47 670.80 
Murcia  309,242 18,780.95 1,729.87 1,271.32 669.52 
Rioja  108,306 18,529.28 2,540.61 1,212.06 637.13 
 
 
Table 3  Proportions of Total Taxable Income Below Thresholds (First 
Income Source) 
     12 Fa    13 Fa    14 Fa 
National  0.29019 0.63216 0.80771 
Andalucía  0.33006 0.69497 0.85926 
Aragón  0.32503 0.69809 0.86190 
Asturias  0.31424 0.70250 0.86856 
Baleares  0.32095 0.62923 0.80426 
Canarias  0.29832 0.63865 0.82860 
Cantabria  0.32786 0.68411 0.85049 
Castilla-León  0.34005 0.71888 0.88787 
Castilla-La  Mancha 0.38301 0.73908 0.89074 
Cataluña  0.25939 0.59872 0.77946 
Valencia  0.34565 0.68570 0.84315 
Extremadura  0.39003 0.74727 0.89608 
Galicia  0.34662 0.69615 0.86208 
Madrid  0.19713 0.50417 0.70211 
Murcia  0.34329 0.69763 0.86529 




All that is required to obtain the values of G are the values of the effective tax 
thresholds, 'k a . For central and regional rates combined, the relevant values are 
2,480; 9,748.11 and 15,693.95. The resulting values of G are given in Table 5. From 
the analytical results derived above, for any tax bracket, multiplying G by the 
relevant tax rate gives the ratio of tax raised per capita by the bracket to the total 
income per capita. As the tax rates are common across regions, comparisons of the 
extent of revenue within each region arising from income source 1 can be made by 
moving down the columns. The table shows the relative importance of the top tax 
bracket in Madrid, and the unimportance of the bottom tax bracket, compared with 
other regions.




Table 4  Proportions of Taxpayers below Thresholds (First Income Source) 
     2 Fa     3 Fa     4 Fa  
National  0.56074 0.86344 0.95491 
Andalucía  0.59035 0.88808 0.96763 
Aragón  0.58030 0.88792 0.96704 
Asturias  0.55800 0.88570 0.96864 
Baleares  0.60398 0.86906 0.95701 
Canarias  0.57119 0.86188 0.95896 
Cantabria  0.58835 0.88265 0.96492 
Castilla-León  0.59488 0.89430 0.97353 
Castilla-La  Mancha 0.64104 0.90839 0.97528 
Cataluña  0.52079 0.84388 0.94432 
Valencia  0.61925 0.89186 0.96510 
Extremadura  0.65168 0.91198 0.97600 
Galicia  0.61687 0.89160 0.96861 
Madrid  0.45962 0.79380 0.92136 
Murcia  0.60652 0.89010 0.96956 
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Table 5  Values of G for each Tax Threshold  (First Income Source 
According to Total Tax Schedule) 
    1 Ga     2 Ga     3 Ga     4 Ga  
National  0.290193 0.305909 0.132714 0.158296 
Andalucía  0.330057 0.326354 0.123800 0.114204 
Aragón  0.325034 0.333407 0.123714 0.111220 
Asturias  0.314239 0.347408 0.125427 0.106700 
Baleares  0.320947 0.275424 0.132178 0.162015 
Canarias  0.298323 0.304869 0.143401 0.139719 
Cantabria  0.327856 0.318916 0.125351 0.121344 
Castilla-León  0.340052 0.338948 0.127502 0.089822 
Castilla-La  Mancha  0.383015 0.318322 0.114534 0.087180 
Cataluña  0.259386 0.303344 0.136769 0.181298 
Valencia  0.345647 0.303937 0.119315 0.127588 
Extremadura  0.390029 0.319601 0.112424 0.081951 
Galicia  0.346616 0.312747 0.125395 0.111321 
Madrid  0.197128 0.273870 0.148977 0.249379 
Murcia  0.343290 0.316890 0.126414 0.109277 





Table 6  Estimated Total Tax Revenue (€s) 





National  51,148,217,111 33,061,697,229 18,086,519,880 
Andalucía  6,155,788,630 3,972,274,107 2,183,514,522 
Aragón  1,776,894,526 1,145,725,113 631,169,413 
Asturias 1,352,992,058  874,123,198  478,868,860 
Baleares 1,271,754,868  818,791,512  452,963,356 
Canarias  1,810,355,523 1,167,961,396 642,394,127 
Cantabria  683,181,263 440,400,756 242,780,507 
Castilla-León  2,672,907,005 1,725,380,941 947,526,063 
Castilla-La Mancha  1,410,927,079  910,996,715  499,930,364 
Cataluña 11,679,310,225  7,520,720,015  4,158,590,210 
Valencia  4,981,828,923 3,209,163,568 1,772,665,355 
Extremadura  705,599,802 456,083,010 249,516,793 
Galicia  2,521,071,133 1,627,923,016 893,148,116 
Madrid 12,712,845,321  8,281,203,401  4,431,641,920 
Murcia 1,034,493,203  667,339,810  367,153,393 
Rioja  378,267,552 243,610,671 134,656,881 
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For example, for all regions combined, the total income tax revenue, gross of the tax 
credits, is given from (18) by the total number of positive taxpayers multiplied by the 
term (where values for G are rounded to two decimal places for convenience): 
 
   
0.29
0.31




   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 (19) 
 
When the total amount of tax credits per (positive) taxpayer, of 1,228+646, is 
deducted from this result, the net tax per capita is obtained. Multiplying this value by 
the total number of taxpayers gives the value in the first row of Table 6.
6 Results are 
obtained for the regions simply by changing the vector of arithmetic mean incomes 
and the vector of G values in (19), and then using the appropriate values of N and the 
average tax credits. 
 
The effects on gross tax revenue of changes in the average income from the second 
source, or changes in the relative dispersion of income from the first source (which 
changes the Lorenz curve and thus the G values), or changes in the marginal tax rate 
structure, are thus easily examined using modifications to expressions of the form 
shown in (19). For example, elimination of the top marginal income tax bracket 
simply means that the row vector of tax rates has only three elements and the column 
vector of G values is reduced to three elements with the third element replaced by 
0.29.  
 
Changes in the tax thresholds have the effect of changing the G values. Hence a 
‘ready reckoner’ could be produced by replacing Tables 4 and 5 by larger tables 
giving values of the distribution function and first moment distribution function for a 
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range of income levels. The introduction of additional tax brackets for the second 
income source could be accommodated by producing similar tables for that source.  
 
The effects of change in the distribution of income within a region can be examined 
using the same kind of summary information. For example, if mean income 
increases, whereby incomes in a region are assumed to increase by the same 
proportion, this is equivalent to a reduction in the tax thresholds, so that information 
about the Lorenz curve (the F and  1 F  values) can be used to obtain the appropriate G 
value. A change in inequality can be accommodated by specifying the way in which 
the Lorenz curve for the region changes.  
 
The difficulty of dealing with the central and regional tax credits and thus aggregate 
net income tax revenue remains, as an analytical expression for aggregate credits has 
not been obtained.  
 
4.1  Further Comparisons 
As suggested above, the effects of changing only the tax rates are easily examined in 
this framework, as only the vector of marginal rates needs to be altered in expressions 
corresponding to (19). For example, the previous discussion has not allowed for the 
small change in the tax rate structure in Madrid in 2007, making it unique among the 
Spanish regions. The income thresholds for the first income source are the same as in 
Table 1 above, and the central government rates are the same, but the marginal tax 
rates for Madrid became 0.0794, 0.0943, 0.1266 and 0.1577 for the four income 
brackets. This involves a slight reduction in all the rates, with the largest reductions 
being for the first and second tax brackets. Given the nature of the distribution of 
income in Madrid for the first source, it is anticipated that this would have relatively 
little effect on total revenue. But in view of the differences among regions in their 
income distributions, the same could not be said of the other regions.   
 
The effects on total tax revenue, and revenue within each region, if all regions were 
to adopt the Madrid structure, can easily be obtained using the information given 
above. The percentage changes in total (central plus regional) tax revenue and in the 15 
 
regional tax revenue alone are shown in Table 7. In producing these values, it was 
assumed that the average tax credits within each region remain unchanged. Clearly 
the poorer regions, where a much larger proportion of total income is obtained by 
those who fall into the first two tax brackets, would experience substantially larger 
reductions in tax revenue.  
 
Table 7  Percentage Reduction in Tax Revenue from Adoption of Madrid’s 






National 1.7268  5.0096 
Andalucía 1.9868  5.8113 
Aragon 1.8754  5.4658 
Asturias 1.9240  5.6338 
Baleares 1.7081  4.9486 
Canarias 1.8697  5.4546 
Cantabria 1.8631  5.4260 
Castilla-Leon 2.0137  5.8968 
Castilla-LaMancha 2.1540  6.3276 
Cataluña 1.6141  4.6696 
Valencia 1.8701  5.4398 
Extremadura 2.2008 6.4844 
Galicia 1.9373  5.6687 
Madrid 1.3815  3.9630 
Murcia 2.0302  5.9393 
Rioja 1.9282  5.6124 
 
 
4.2  Regional Comparisons 
The previous subsection considered the effects on all regions of adopting a different 
regional structure of marginal income tax rates. As explained above, it is possible to 
use the same basic approach to consider the effects of a range of changes in the 
taxable income distributions of each region. This is particularly useful in the present 
context where it is clear that different regions have different fiscal capacities. Such 
disparities in regional revenue-raising abilities are especially evident when, as here, 
progressive taxes are assigned partially to regional governments.  
 16 
 
Central governments normally carry out some form of regional fiscal equalization. 
Under these circumstances, sound design of these inter-regional transfers requires a 
clear understanding of the precise sources of divergence of regional fiscal capacities. 
The present approach can thus contribute to the debate on regional transfers by 
clarifying precisely how regions differ with respect to the tax structure and the 
distribution of taxpayers. This is because the above analytical results make it evident 
that differences in revenue hinge on basically four factors: the number and 
distribution of taxpayers, the distribution of taxable incomes and the specific tax 
parameters that define the structure: these are the marginal tax rates, tax bracket 
thresholds and average tax credits.  
 
The present approach makes it possible to construct a matrix in which each region’s 
tax revenue can be computed under the assumption that it shares one or more of the 
characteristics of other regions. Thus a ‘15 by 15’ matrix is obtained such that each 
entry shows the revenue obtained by a row region, under the assumption that it has a 
particular characteristic of the column region. The leading diagonal of such a square 
matrix obviously shows the actual revenue obtained by the region. This matrix is 
augmented by an additional row and column for the country as a whole. Similarly, 
the information can be displayed in relative terms, showing the percentage 
differences in revenue which could be raised by each region, given different assumed 
characteristics (so that each corresponding leading diagonal element is zero).  
 
To illustrate the kind of information which can be produced along these lines, Tables 
8 to 10 report three such hypothetical ‘16 by 16’ matrices for Spanish regions in the 
2007 fiscal year. Each matrix shows the relative impact on the revenue collection of 
the row region if it were to replicate the specific characteristic of the column region. 
Specifically, Table 8 presents the revenue impact of differences in arithmetic mean 
taxable incomes. Table 9 depicts the effects of differences in the form of the relative 
taxable income distributions; that is, the arithmetic means are unchanged but the 
proportions of people in each tax bracket, and the corresponding proportions of total 
taxable income within each bracket, are assumed to the those of the region in the 17 
 
columns. Finally, Table 10 shows the revenue consequences of simultaneous changes 
in both the arithmetic mean taxable income and the relative distributions of income.
7  
 
For example, Table 8 shows that if Andalucía were to have the same arithmetic mean 
taxable income as Aragon (a given percentage change in all incomes), it would have 
4.17 per cent higher income tax revenue. However, from Table 9 if Andalucia were 
to have its actual arithmetic mean, but the same relative form of income distribution 
as Aragon, it would have slightly less revenue: there would be a reduction of 0.40 per 
cent. Table 10 indicates that if the distribution of taxable income in Andalucia were 
the precisely the same as in Aragon (in both absolute and relative terms), its revenue 
would be 3.77 per cent higher. In fact these effects are additive, so that the elements 
of Table 10 effectively equal the sum of the corresponding elements in Tables 8 and 
9.  
 
                                                 
 
7 In producing these results it has been assumed that average tax credits remain unchanged 18 
 
Table 8  Effects of Varying Arithmetic Mean Taxable Income (Row Region has Mean Income of Column Region) 




LM. Cat.  Val.  Extr.  Gal.  Mad.  Murc. Rioja 
National  0  -14.73 -11.26 -9.33 -5.65 -6.98 -9.19 -17.81 -27.07 12.04 -15.39 -30.96 -19.09 41.57 -17.29 -15.69 
Andalucia  17.31 0  4.17 6.30 10.72 9.01 6.58 -3.56 -14.43  31.42  -0.67  -19.02 -5.07  66.02  -2.98  -0.97 
Aragon  12.32 -3.91  0  2.00 6.15 4.54 2.26 -7.25 -17.44  25.55  -4.54  -21.74 -8.67  57.99  -6.70  -4.82 
Asturias  10.23 -5.86  -1.98  0  4.11 2.52 0.27 -9.17 -19.27  23.35  -6.47  -23.53 -10.57 55.50  -8.63  -6.75 
Baleares  5.80  -9.34 -5.77 -3.79 0  -1.38 -3.64 -12.50 -22.00 18.16 -10.01 -26.01 -13.81 48.49 -11.96 -10.31 
Canarias  7.62  -8.43 -4.63 -2.55 1.48  0  -2.37 -11.77 -21.85 20.73 -9.13 -26.10 -13.16 52.89 -11.21 -9.44 
Cantabria  9.96  -6.10  -2.24  -0.24  3.85 2.28 0  -9.42 -19.51  23.07  -6.74  -23.76 -10.82 55.20  -8.87  -7.03 
Castilla-Leon  21.17  3.60  7.87  9.98  14.51 12.71 10.31 0  -11.04 35.50 2.96  -15.69 -1.54 70.60 0.58  2.67 
Castilla-LaMancha 35.79  16.25 21.04 23.33 28.40 26.34 23.74 12.27  0  51.71 15.59 -5.18 10.55 90.71 12.90 15.29 
Cataluña -10.88  -24.18 -21.09 -19.29 -16.00 -17.15 -19.20 -26.99 -35.34 0  -24.82 -38.86 -28.13 26.70 -26.50 -25.11 
Valencia  17.50 0.66 4.71 6.80 11.09 9.44 7.06 -2.81 -13.38  31.24  0  -17.84 -4.28  64.91  -2.24  -0.30 
Extremadura  42.51  22.23 27.21 29.57 34.85 32.69 30.02 18.11  5.38  59.02 21.56 0  16.33 99.47 18.76 21.26 
Galicia  22.46  5.09  9.28  11.41 15.86 14.13 11.70 1.52  -9.39  36.62 4.43  -13.99 0  71.34 2.10  4.13 
Madrid -30.66  -41.48 -39.04 -37.47 -34.87 -35.68 -37.49 -43.81 -50.61 -21.79 -42.09 -53.46 -44.73 0  -43.39 -42.37 
Murcia  20.99 3.08 7.41 9.60 14.19 12.40 9.90 -0.60 -11.85  35.60  2.40 -16.59 -2.17  71.40  0  2.09 







Table 9  Effects of Varying Relative Incomes: Row Region has F and F1 of Column Region 




LM. Cat.  Val.  Extr. Gal. Mad.  Murc. Rioja 
National  0  -1.98  -2.32 -2.90 0.89 -0.70 -1.80 -3.15 -3.11 0.13 -0.84  -3.30 -1.69 1.69 -1.99 -2.44 
Andalucia  1.89  0  -0.40 -1.09 3.00 1.15 0.14 -1.21 -0.99 1.77 1.32 -1.15 0.40 2.89 0.04  -0.41 
Aragon  2.18  0.37 0  -0.65 3.21 1.47 0.51 -0.77 -0.57 2.07 1.61 -0.73 0.74 3.17 0.41  -0.02 
Asturias  2.99  1.02 0.65  0  4.01 2.25 1.18 -0.19 -0.06 3.00 2.27 -0.23 1.37 4.36 1.04  0.58 
Baleares  -0.93  -2.76 -3.10 -3.70 0  -1.61 -2.61 -3.88  -3.77  -0.91 -1.61 -3.93 -2.44 0.38  -2.74 -3.17 
Canarias  0.74  -1.29  -1.66 -2.29 1.73 0  -1.12 -2.52 -2.43 0.82 -0.06  -2.62 -0.96 2.32 -1.29 -1.76 
Cantabria  1.72  -0.14  -0.51 -1.15 2.73 1.00 0  -1.30 -1.14 1.66 1.08 -1.30 0.21 2.87 -0.11 -0.55 
Castilla-Leon  2.96  1.17 0.77  0.07 4.11 2.22 1.29 0  0.28  2.74 2.51 0.14 1.60 3.65 1.24  0.81 
Castilla-LaMancha  2.36  0.72 0.27  -0.50 3.68 1.61 0.80 -0.45 0  1.91 2.18 -0.11 1.23 2.38 0.83  0.42 
Cataluña  -0.30  -2.38 -2.68 -3.21 0.46 -0.99 -2.17 -3.55  -3.63  0  -1.33 -3.84 -2.15 1.86  -2.42 -2.89 
Valencia  0.45  -1.26  -1.64 -2.31 1.53 -0.25 -1.15 -2.38 -2.12 0.26 0  -2.26 -0.87 1.16 -1.20 -1.62 
Extremadura  2.30  0.74 0.27  -0.53 3.68 1.55 0.79 -0.42 0.10  1.74 2.24 0  1.28 2.01 0.87  0.47 
Galicia  1.30  -0.42  -0.81 -1.50 2.43 0.59 -0.31 -1.55 -1.27 1.07 0.89 -1.40 0  1.91 -0.35 -0.77 
Madrid  -2.98  -5.22 -5.47 -5.91 -2.43 -3.65 -4.96 -6.39  -6.68  -2.39 -4.33 -6.92 -5.10 0  -5.32 -5.81 
Murcia  1.79  -0.06  -0.47 -1.18 2.95 1.04 0.07 -1.26 -1.00 1.60 1.29 -1.15 0.36 2.59 0  -0.45 






Table 10  Effects of Varying Mean Taxable Income and its Distribution: Row Region has Distribution of Column Region 




LM. Cat.  Val.  Extr.  Gal.  Mad.  Murc. Rioj. 
National  0  -16.30 -13.18 -11.99 -4.75 -7.66 -10.72 -20.19 -28.76 12.38 -15.78 -32.54 -20.16 45.86 -18.72 -17.39 
Andalucia  19.69  0  3.77  5.20  13.96 10.44 6.74  -4.71  -15.06 34.65 0.63  -19.63 -4.66 75.11 -2.92 -1.32 
Aragon  14.94  -3.54 0  1.35  9.56  6.26  2.79  -7.95  -17.66 28.97 -2.94 -21.95 -7.91 66.93 -6.28 -4.78 
Asturias  13.49  -4.85 -1.34 0  8.15  4.87  1.43  -9.23  -18.86 27.42 -4.26 -23.12 -9.19 65.08 -7.57 -6.08 
Baleares  4.89  -11.89 -8.68 -7.46 0  -3.00 -6.15 -15.90 -24.72 17.63 -11.36 -28.61 -15.86 52.09 -14.38 -13.02 
Canarias  8.39  -9.47 -6.05 -4.75 3.19  0  -3.36 -13.74 -23.12 21.96 -8.89 -27.27 -13.69 58.65 -12.12 -10.67 
Cantabria  11.97  -6.23 -2.74 -1.42 6.67  3.42  0  -10.58 -20.14 25.80 -5.64 -24.37 -10.54 63.19 -8.93 -7.45 
Castilla-Leon  25.08 4.84 8.71 10.19 19.18 15.56 11.76 0  -10.64  40.45  5.49 -15.34 0.05 82.03  1.83 3.48 
Castilla-LaMancha 40.13  17.39 21.74 23.40 33.51 29.44 25.17 11.95  0  57.41 18.12 -5.28 12.01 104.13 14.01 15.86 
Cataluña -11.00  -25.48 -22.71 -21.66 -15.22 -17.81 -20.53 -28.95 -36.56 0  -25.02 -39.92 -28.91 29.75 -27.63 -26.46 
Valencia  18.49  -0.61 3.04  4.44  12.93 9.51  5.92  -5.18  -15.21 32.99 0  -19.65 -5.13 72.22 -3.45 -1.89 
Extremadura  47.30  23.61 28.14 29.87 40.40 36.17 31.72 17.95  5.50  65.29 24.37 0  18.00 113.96 20.09 22.02 
Galicia  24.51 4.69 8.48 9.93 18.74 15.19 11.47 -0.05 -10.46  39.55  5.32 -15.06 0  80.26  1.75 3.36 
Madrid -31.83  -43.15 -40.98 -40.16 -35.13 -37.15 -39.27 -45.85 -51.79 -23.24 -42.78 -54.42 -45.82 0  -44.83 -43.90 
Murcia  23.48 3.04 6.95 8.44 17.53 13.87 10.03 -1.85 -12.60  39.01  3.69 -17.34 -1.80  81.01  0  1.66 
Rioja  20.90 1.31 5.06 6.49 15.20 11.69 8.02 -3.37 -13.66  35.77  1.94 -18.20 -3.32  76.00  -1.59  0 
 
 
 5  Conclusions 
The aim of this paper was to derive analytical expressions for aggregate revenue and 
the revenue elasticity of complex personal income tax systems, as applied to tax units 
and in aggregate. The complexity arises from the schedular nature of the system, the 
role of central and regional governments, and the existence of a range of tax credits 
and eligible expenditures and deductions.  
 
Formal expressions for aggregate tax revenue were derived, in terms of the 
distribution of taxable income within each region. It was possible to separate total 
revenue into components relating to the income tax structure and summary measures 
of the distribution of taxable income, in particular the proportions of taxpayers, and 
of total taxable income, in each tax bracket. This made it possible to examine the 
sources of differences among regions.  
 
The general approach was then applied to the personal income tax structure in Spain 
which, since reforms dating from 2002, has similar characteristics. The role of 








Appendix A. Separate values of G for Central and 
Regional Governments 
Central Government Tax Schedule 
    1 Ga     2 Ga     3 Ga     4 Ga  
National  0.290193 0.305909 0.132724 0.161007 
Andalucía  0.330057 0.326354 0.123810 0.116320 
Aragón  0.325034 0.333407 0.123724 0.113364 
Asturias  0.314239 0.347408 0.125436 0.108673 
Baleares  0.320947 0.275424 0.132188 0.164704 
Canarias  0.298323 0.304869 0.143412 0.142245 
Cantabria  0.327856 0.318916 0.125361 0.123590 
Castilla-León  0.340052 0.338948 0.127512 0.091601 
Castilla-La  Mancha  0.383015 0.318322 0.114543 0.088942 
Cataluña  0.259386 0.303344 0.136780 0.184428 
Valencia  0.345647 0.303937 0.119325 0.129922 
Extremadura  0.390029 0.319601 0.112433 0.083703 
Galicia  0.346616 0.312747 0.125405 0.113442 
Madrid  0.197128 0.275025 0.149916 0.254015 
Murcia  0.343290 0.316890 0.126424 0.111306 
Rioja  0.363215 0.306374 0.127387 0.103131 
 
Regional Government Tax Schedule 
    1 Ga     2 Ga     3 Ga     4 Ga  
National  0.290193 0.305909 0.132695 0.153661 
Andalucía  0.330057 0.326354 0.123782 0.110587 
Aragón  0.325034 0.333407 0.123696 0.107555 
Asturias  0.314239 0.347408 0.125408 0.103328 
Baleares  0.320947 0.275424 0.132159 0.157417 
Canarias  0.298323 0.304869 0.143380 0.135400 
Cantabria  0.327856 0.318916 0.125333 0.117504 
Castilla-León  0.340052 0.338948 0.127483 0.086780 
Castilla-La  Mancha  0.383015 0.318322 0.114517 0.084169 
Cataluña  0.259386 0.303344 0.136749 0.175948 
Valencia  0.345647 0.303937 0.119298 0.123599 
Extremadura  0.390029 0.319601 0.112407 0.078957 
Galicia  0.346616 0.312747 0.125377 0.107694 
Madrid  0.197128 0.271630 0.147188 0.241403 
Murcia  0.343290 0.316890 0.126396 0.105809 
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